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Harris v. McRae: Indigent Women Must Bear the
Consequences of the Hyde Amendment
INTRODUCTION

The raging controversy over the abortion right' and the utilization of public funds to assert that right has inspired an abundance
of legislative discord2 and judicial decisions.3 At the heart of this
morass lie irreconcilable differences concerning the nature of life
itself. To those who view abortion as the taking of a human life,
government expenditures through Medicaid constitute a subsidization of murder.4 Conversely, advocates of "freedom of choice"
maintain that an indigent woman is entitled to Medicaid funds for
the purpose of exercising her constitutionally protected right to
procure an abortion.6 These conflicting viewpoints collided with
the enactment of the Hyde Amendment,' an appropriations restriction which drastically curtails the availability of federal funds
for Medicaid abortions.

1. The right to have an abortion was first recognized in the landmark decisions of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. Legislative dissidence is apparent upon examination of the congressional debates surrounding the passage of the various versions of the Hyde Amendment. See, e.g., 122 CONG.
REc. H8632 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Abzug); 122 CONG. REC. S16114 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 1976) (remarks of Senator Stevens); 123 CONG. REC. S19440 (daily ed. Dec. 7,
1977) (remarks of Senator Magnuson); 123 CONG. REC. H6083 (daily ed. June 17, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Hyde).
3. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
4. Proponents of the "right to life" movement find the granting of Medicaid funds for
abortions untenable on moral grounds. Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payments for Abortion, 28 HAST. L.J. 931, 931 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Butler]. See generally Dellapenna,
The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40 U. PiTT. L. REV. 359 (1979).
5. The "freedom of choice" ideology supports the position that women have a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. It is argued that the government cannot curtail the access
to abortion by denying Medicaid funds to indigent women. This movement rejects the proposition that abortion is a moral wrong because morality is an extremely volatile concept.
"Freedom of choice" advocates point out that it was not until the early nineteenth century
that laws prohibiting abortions were enacted. Butler, note 4 supra, at 931. See also Comment, Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Non-Therapeutic Abortions: The State Does Not
Have To Pay The Bill, 9 Loy. CHi. L.J. 288 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, NonTherapeutic Abortions]; Comment, State Limitations Upon the Availability and Accessibility of Abortions after Wade and Bolton, 25 KAN. L. REV. 87 (1976).
6. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418.
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In Harris v. McRae,7 the Supreme Court confronted the question of the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment and its implications with regard to medically necessary abortions. 8 Attacked on
the grounds that it violated the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses of the fifth amendment, the Hyde Amendment
withstood all constitutional challenges. 9 The Amendment was thus
revitalized10 as an influence over state abortion funding pursuant
to Title XIX."1
This comment will trace the converging paths of pre-Hyde
Amendment Medicaid legislation and the constitutional right of
abortion. The Supreme Court's resolution in Harris v. McRae of
the statutory issue as well as the constitutional issues raised by the
Hyde Amendment will then be discussed and analyzed. Finally,
this discussion will examine the catalytic effect the Hyde Amendment will have on curtailing the freedom of indigent women to
choose abortion as an alternative to childbirth.
7. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
8. In a trio of concurrent cases, the Supreme Court had earlier determined that those
states participating in the Medicaid program are not required by Title XIX of the Social
Security Act to fund non-therapeuticabortions. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
9. The Hyde Amendment was also challenged on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague. See note 118 infra.
10. From the date of its passage, the enforcement of the Hyde Amendment has been
impeded by preliminary injunctive orders. See Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975);
McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865
(D.N.J. 1976). Its basic purpose has also been circumvented by the procurement of abortions without guarantee of reimbursement. See Doe v. Westby, 483 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D.
1974).
The brief but checkered history of the Hyde Amendment includes the issuance of a
nationwide injunction prohibiting its enforcement. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533
(1976). Additionally, the status of several lower court decisions regarding the effect of the
Hyde Amendment on Title XIX was questionable. See Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d
121 (1st Cir. 1979); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d
1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (per curiam), vacated and remanded in light of Beal v. Doe and Maher v. Roe, mem.
sub nom. Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976); Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660
(D. Conn. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401
F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973).
11. In Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 2694 (1980), the Supreme Court relied on its simultaneously created precedent of Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980) in holding that a
state participating in the Medicaid program is not obligated under Title XIX to fund those
therapeutic abortions for which federal reimbursement has been withdrawn under the Hyde
Amendment.
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THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE PREGNANCY

A FundamentalPersonal Right
In the landmark companion cases of Roe v. Wade' and Doe v.
Bolton,"' the Supreme Court determined that the constitutionally
protected right of privacy" encompasses a woman's decision to obtain an abortion. 6 Although not absolute, the right of a woman to
elect to terminate her pregnancy is recognized as a fundamental,
personal right.1 6 Consequently, a state abortion regulation is justi17
fiable only upon the showing of a compelling state interest.
In Wade, the Court recognized the privacy interest of the
mother,18 and the competing state interests in potential fetal life
and maternal health.1 ' The Court held that during the first trimester of pregnancy, a woman may exercise her right to secure an
abortion free from any state interference because of the minimal
risk abortion poses to her health at that time. 0 At the end of the
first trimester, however, the state's compelling interest in the
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Wade invalidated Texas criminal abortion laws which prohibited the performance of an abortion unless it was necessary to save the life of the mother.
13. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Bolton invalidated Georgia statutes which limited the availability of abortions.
14. Although a general privacy right is not explicit in the Constitution, protection is
afforded on the ground that the Bill of Rights' specific guarantees have penumbras, formed
by emanations of those guarantees that create zones of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In Griswold, Justice Douglas regarded the sources of the right of privacy to be the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id. Justices Goldberg, Brennan and Chief Justice Warren believed the right sprang from the ninth amendment. Id.
499. The two remaining concurring Justices, Harlan and White, relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment to support the newly-recognized right. Id. at 500, 502. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 219 (1965). See generally Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890); Comment, Non-Therapeutic Abortions, note 5 supra, at 290 n.5.
Further expansion of the right of privacy is illustrated by Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (struck down a New York statute which prohibited the
sale and distribution of contraceptives to individuals under sixteen years of age). See also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
16. Id. at 152.
17. Id. at 155. See notes 118-23 infra and accompanying text; Kramer v. Union Free
School District, 395 U.S. 621, 630 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42
(1942). See generally B. SCHWARTZ, CoNsTrTiONAL LAW (1972).
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
19. Id. at 163-64.
20. Id. at 164. The Court noted, however, that a state may require the physician performing the abortion to be currently licensed by the state. Id. at 165.

258

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

health of the mother is triggered.2 1 Abortion regulations may then
be implemented, provided they reasonably relate to the preservation and protection of maternal health.2 At viability, the state's
interest in potential human life becomes compelling.23 At this time,
stringent regulations on the abortion procedure, to the point of
proscribing all but those abortions necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother, are permissible. 4
Once the "fundamental" right to abortion was established, a variety of peripheral issues were raised in the courts.25 Although the
Supreme Court has attempted to avoid further entanglement in
the abortion arena,2 it has made significant strides in clarifying a
woman's right to an abortion. For example, the Court has determined that a state may not precondition a married woman's right
to obtain an abortion on spousal consent;2 7 a state may not delegate an unmarried minor's abortion decision to a parent;2 8 nor may
it deny minors access to abortions.2 9
Public Funding of Abortions
The Supreme Court has adopted a more conservative stance,
however, with respect to the public funding of abortions. In Maher
v. Roe,30 the Court held that a Connecticut statute restricting
Medicaid funding to medically necessary first trimester abortions3
21. Id. at 164.
22. Id. at 163.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 164-65.
25. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (issue of whether physicians may
assert the rights of their female patients with respect to governmental infringement on the
right to choose abortion).
26. See Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1000 (1975); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
27. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
28. Id. at 74.
29. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
30. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
31. Id. at 466 n.2, quoting Connecticut Welfare Department, Public Assistance Program
Manual, Vol. 3, c.III, § 275 (1975), which provides in relevant part:
The Department makes payment for abortion services under the Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions are met: 1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medically necessary. The term
"Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric necessity. 2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or licensed clinic when the patient is in the first
trimester of pregnancy. . . . 3. The written request for the abortion is submitted
by the patient, and in the case of a minor, from [sic] the parent or guardian. 4.
Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of Medical Services,
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did not violate the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal
protection guarantees.3 2 Selecting the rational basis test as the appropriate standard of review, 33 the Court found that the Connecticut regulation furthered the state's "strong and legitimate interest
3
in encouraging normal childbirth." 4

3
Employing the Maher rationale, the Court in Poelker v. Doe, 5
upheld a St. Louis, Missouri policy directive which prohibited the
use of city hospital facilities for performing non-therapeutic abortions. In upholding the mayoral directive, the Court demonstrated
its preference for deferring abortion-funding decisions to the
voters.3 6
The Court had thus made it clear that an indigent woman's right
to obtain an abortion does not encompass a corresponding right to
Medicaid funds beyond the first trimester or to the use of public
hospital facilities. Left undecided, however, was the question of
whether funding for therapeutic 7 abortions may be denied Medicaid-eligible women.

MEDICAID AND THE HYDE AMENDMENT

Medicaid, established in 1965 by Title XIX of the Social SecurDivision of Health Services, Department of Social Services.
32. 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977).
33. The Court determined that the abortion regulation did not infringe upon a fundamental right or create an invidious discrimination against a suspect class, and therefore the
compelling interest standard was not applied. 432 U.S. at 478. See authorities cited in note
120 infra.
34. 432 U.S. at 478, quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
35. 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 521.
37. The definition of "therapeutic" or "medically necessary" lies at the core of the Hyde
Amendment controversy. In its broadest version, the Hyde Amendment permitted the funding of Medicaid abortions "in those instances where severe and long-lasting physical health
damage to the mother would result if the pregnency were carried to term when so determined by two physicians." Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460
(1977). Although this version of the Hyde Amendment does not set forth guidelines for
determining the appropriate brand of medical necessity, it specifically excludes abortions
performed for the psychological health of the mother.
The medical community applies a more liberal definition of "therapeutic": the care which
is responsive to the problem for which it is offered. See Bunker, Elective Hysterectomy: Pro
and Con, 295 N. ENG. J. MEDICINE 267 (1976); STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG. 2D SESS.,

COST & QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE: UNNCESSARY

SURGERY 9 (1976). See also 42 U.S.C.
1396a(a)(30) (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975).
Another interpretation of medical necessity may be gleaned from Roe v. Wade, which
included physical, mental, and psychological factors as important considerations in a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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ity Act,38 provides federal grants to those states implementing
medical assistance programs for the needy. 39 Under this jointly
funded governmental scheme,40 once a state elects to participate, it
must comply with the minimum federal requirements set forth in
Title. XIX. 41 A participating state is, however, afforded a great deal
of latitude in the organization and administration of its individual
health care plan 42 provided "reasonable standards' 4 are main-

38. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97 § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
99 1396-1396d (1970)), as amended, (Supp.V 1975).
39. The federal Medicaid plan distinguishes between two categories of "needy" persons:
(1) the "categorically needy," which includes families with dependent children, eligible for
welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (42 U.S.C. §
601-02 (1970)), and the aged, blind, and disabled, entitled to public assistance under the
Supplemental Security Income program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83(c) (see 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(10)(A) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975)); and (2) the "medically needy," which
includes those who are ineligible for welfare because they have too many resources but
whose medical expenses make them medically indigent within the meaning of the welfare
laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(C) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975).
40. A cohesive plan of "cooperative federalism" has emerged to promote the common
goal of both state and federal governments. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 491
(1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
Depending on state income, the federal government furnishes between 50% and 83% of
the funds required to support a particular state's medical assistance program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396(b) (1970).
41. A participating state must at the very least provide five broad areas of care for the
"categorically needy":
(1) inpatient hospital services;
(2) outpatient hospital services;
(3) other laboratory and x-ray services;
(4) skilled nursing facility services, periodic screening and diagnosis of minors, and
family planning services;
(5) physicians' services.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(13)(B) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975), (1)-(5) (1970), as amended,
(Supp.V 1975).
In addition to these five categories, participating states are encouraged to fund another
twelve types of medical services for the "categorically needy." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1970),
as amended, (Supp.V 1975). Should a state elect to include the "medically needy" in its
program, these individuals are entitled either to the same minimum five areas of medical
treatment that must be provided to the "categorically needy" or any seven of the twelve
discretionary types of services. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
42. See New York Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (New York requirement necessitating acceptance of employment as a precondition for receipt of assistance under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) held valid as within a state's
discretionary power under the Social Security Act); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (upheld Maryland regulation limiting AFDC benefits for any one family to less than
their ascertained per capita need as consistent with the Social Security Act).
43. A state plan must "include reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for
and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are consistent with the
objectives of [Title XIX] .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(17) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975).
See also Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
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tained for determining eligibility.
Abortion was not mentioned in either the original enactment of
Title XIX"4 or the 1972 amendment," which added family planning to the arsenal of available Medicaid services. Consequently,
considerable speculation had arisen concerning the public funding
of abortion. Adding to this funding dilemma, in 1976, Congress
passed the first of three versions of the Hyde Amendment, 6 a
"rider' 17 to the annual Department of Health, Education and Wel-

44. "Title XIX does not . . .specify or limit the type or extent of medical assistance
which the states must furnish." Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.N.H. 1979).
45. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 299E, 86 Stat. 1329, amending 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a) (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975)).
The right to secure an abortion was not established until 1973 when the Supreme Court
decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v..
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See note
1 supra. But see Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 622-23 (3rd Cir. 1975), in which the court of
appeals construed the 1972 amendment to include abortion services, since Congress did not
expressly exclude them.
46. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976).
The Hyde Amendment imposes severe restrictions on the use of federal funds for publicly
funded abortions. Since its original enactment in 1976, the Hyde Amendment has been
modified twice. In its original, most restrictive form, the amendment provided: "None of the
funds contained in this Act shall be used to perform abortions except when the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term." Id.
The 1978 version lessened the restriction somewhat by providing:
That none of the funds provided for in this paragraph shall be used to perform
abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus
were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest, when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a
law enforcement agency or public health service, or except in those instances
where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result
if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians.
Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205 § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).
In its current form, the variation of the Hyde Amendment applicable for fiscal year 1980
provides:
[N]one of . . . the funds provided by this joint resolution . . .shall be used to
perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the
fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the
victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a
law enforcement agency or public health service.
Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123 § 109, 93 Stat. 926. See also Act of Oct. 12, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93 Stat. 662 (1979).
For the purposes of this Comment, because the version under consideration in Harris v.
McRae was the restrictive, 1976 enactment, the term "Hyde Amendment" will refer to the
original amendment.
47. It has been argued that the use of a "rider" as a means of substantively amending
welfare legislation is inappropriate because thorough analysis and meaningful committee
discussion is precluded by Congress' own procedural rules. See 122 CONG. REc. H8632 (daily
ed. Aug. 10, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Abzug). See also Note, The Effect of Recent Medicaid
Decisions on a Constitutional Right: Abortions Only for the Rich?, 6 FORDHAM URS. L.J.
687, 690 n.23 (1978). See generally Note, Zbaraz v. Quern - Abortion and Medicaid: The
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fare 8 appropriations bill. This legislation, in its original and most
restrictive form, prohibited the federal funding of abortions except
in those situations "when the life of the mother would be endan'49
gered if the fetus were carried to term.
A primary question"0 presented by the enactment of the Hyde
Amendment concerned its substantive effect on Title XIX. 5' If
construed to merely withdraw federal funds previously allocated

Public Funding Dilemma, 12 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 609 (1979).
48. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has been renamed the Department of Health and Human Services. Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-98, Title III,
§§ 301-07, 93 Stat. 677-681 (1979).
49. See note 46 supra.
50. In addition to the central issue, the circuitous manner in which the Hyde Amendment revised the Medicaid statute poses significant problems regarding its legitimacy. Traditionally, legislation by appropriation has been a disfavored means of effectuating changes
in existing laws. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974), quoting Posadas v. National
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190
(1978), where the Supreme Court emphasized the dangers of applying appropriations acts
substantively:
We recognize that both substantive enactments and appropriations measures are
"acts of Congress," but the latter have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs. When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without
such an assurance, every appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute
which might prohibit the expenditure.
By its own rules, Congress is to abstain from enacting an appropriation bill affecting the
substance of other legislation. Senate Standing Rule XVI, § 4 (94th Cong. 1975) provides:
"[No amendment which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill, nor shall any amendment not germane or relevant to the subject matter contained in the bill be received." House Rule XXI, § 2 (94th Cong. 1976) provides:
No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by
law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such public works and objects as
are already in progress. Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment
thereto changing existing law be in order, except such as being germane to the
subject matter of the bill shall retrench expenditures by the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States, by the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States, or by the
reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill.
51. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979); Preterm,
Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975);
Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 409 F.
Supp. 731 .(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (per curiam), vacated and remanded in light of Beal v. Doe and
Maher v. Roe, men. sub nom. Coe v. Hooker, 406 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.H. 1976); Roe v.
Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D.Conn. 1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189
(D. Utah 1973).
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for Medicaid abortions, participating states might still be obligated
to provide abortion services and shoulder the entire economic burden.5 2 If, however, the Hyde Amendment substantively amended
Title XIX by removing certain abortions from the scope of Medicaid coverage, a state would be relieved from funding those abortions unless it elected to do so."s
In Beat v. Doe, 54 the Supreme Court resolved the issue of state
funding of elective abortions by narrowly construing the Medicaid
statute. 5 Holding the funding of non-therapeutic abortions to be
optional, the Court found no express or implied congressional intent requiring states to fund elective abortions."6 In addition, the
Court affirmed the notion that states are afforded wide discretion
in selecting the types of medical assistance offerred. 57 A state's obligation to provide funds for medically necessary abortions under
Title XIX, however, remained undetermined.
Because of the inherent tension between the Hyde Amendment,
Medicaid, and the right to obtain an abortion, a definitive finding
on the validity and construction of the Hyde Amendment was of
paramount importance. In order for the Hyde Amendment to
achieve its intended purpose of curtailing abortions by withholding
federal funds,5 8 it must not only be construed to alter Title XIX,
but also to withstand various constitutionally-based attacks. These
challenges were considered by the Supreme Court in Harris v.
McRae.

52. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1977).
53. Id. at 447.
54. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
55. Id. at 444.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 447.
58. Congressman Hyde, the sponsor of the original Hyde Amendment, unequivocally
manifested his intent to halt all abortions by any available means:
Yesterday, remarks were made that it is unfortunate to burden an appropriation
bill with complex issues, such as bussing, abortion and the like. I certainly agree
that it is very unfortunate. The problem is that there is no other vehicle that
reaches this floor in which these complex issues can be involved. Constitutional
amendments which prohibit abortions stay languishing in subcommittee, much
less committee, and so the only vehicle wherethe members may work their will,
unfortunately, is an appropriation bill. I regret that. I certainly would like to prevent, if I could legally, any body [sic] having an abortion, a rich woman, a middleclass woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the
HEW medicaid bill. A life is a life. The life of a little ghetto kid is just as important as the life of a rich person. And so we proceed in this bill.
123 CONG. REc. H6083 (daily ed. June 17, 1977).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION

The constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment was attacked on
the day of its enactment in McRae v. Mathews.59 The plaintiffs"0

sought to invalidate the amendment and to enjoin its enforcement.
After a preliminary hearing, the district court granted a nationwide injunction which prohibited the Secretary of Health, Educa-

tion, and Welfare from enforcing the Hyde Amendment and compelled the continued disbursement of federal funds to cover
elective abortions obtained under Medicaid.6 1
62
Subsequent to the Supreme Court decisions of Maher v. Roe
and Beal v. Doe," which decided the issue of the availability of
public funding for elective abortions, several new plaintiffs" intervened in the suit. These new plaintiffs requested Medicaid funding
for therapeutic abortions. Therefore, instead of examining the
Hyde Amendment in the context of elective abortions, the district
court was required to focus on its validity with respect to medically
necessary or therapeutic abortions. 6"
In McRae v. Califano, the district court held that the Hyde
Amendment violated the free exercise clause of the first amend-

59. 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
60. The plaintiffs formed a group representing diverse socio-economic backgrounds: Cora
McRae, a New York resident in the first trimester of pregnancy who desired to obtain an
abortion through the Medicaid program; Dr. Irwin B. Teran, a licensed physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology; Planned Parenthood of New York City, Inc.; and The New
York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, a public benefit corporation and provider of
health and medical services, including abortions. Id. at 535-36.
61. In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court was satisfied that the plaintiffs had established a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Id. at 541. In addition, the plaintiffs established their standing to sue and made a showing of irreparable
harm. Id. at 538.
62. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
63. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
64. Additional plaintiffs were: Jane Doe, Mary Doe, Susan Roe, and Ann Mae, all New
York residents eligible for Medicaid benefits and precluded from obtaining medically necessary abortions because of the Hyde Amendment; Jane Hodgson, M.D., David B. Bingham,
M.D., Hugh Savage, M.D., Edgar W. Jackson, M.D., and Lewis H. Koplik, M.D., physicians
who perform abortions for Medicaid recipients; Women's Division of the Board of Global
Ministries of the United Methodist Church; and Theressa Hoover and Ellen Kirby, two
officers of the Women's Division.
65. Prior to addressing the constitutional issues, the district court rejected the plaintiffs'
statutory argument that Title XIX requires a participating state to fund all medically necessary abortions regardless of the availability of federal funds. Instead, the court construed
the Hyde Amendment to substantively amend Title XIX and relieve a state from carrying
the full funding burden for medically necessary abortions. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp.
630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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ments" and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.6 7 It
then recertified the McRae case as a nationwide class action on
behalf of all Medicaid-eligible pregnant women wishing to obtain
medically necessary abortions, and all licensed providers of these
types of abortions." In addition, the court ordered the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare to "cease to give effect" to the
Hyde Amendment with respect to therapeutic abortions and to
continue the authorization of federal matching funds in reimbursement for such abortions."'
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

In Harris v. McRae,7 0 the Supreme Court conducted a two-part
analysis of the Hyde Amendment. The Court resolved the statutory state funding question under Title XIX, and considered the
constitutional issues surrounding the right of abortion.
The Statutory Issue
The Court first examined the statutory issue 71 of whether, as a
result of the Hyde Amendment, a state participating in the Medicaid program was obligated to bear the total cost of medically nec66. The court ascertained that the decision to terminate pregnancy for medical reasons
may be a product of a religiously formed conscience. Id. at 742. Specifically, a woman's
decision to secure a therapeutic abortion may stem from certain Jewish and Protestant beliefs. For this reason, the court held that the Hyde Amendment contravened the free exercise guarantee of the first amendment. Id. Furthermore, Judge Dooling found the standards
contained in the Hyde Amendment "alien" to current medical standards. Id. at 667. The
medical relevance of poverty, considerations of fetal abnormality, familial problems, damage
to mental health, and fetal viability were all excluded from consideration under the Hyde
Amendment's narrow terms. Id. at 668-90.
67. The district court found the Hyde Amendment to be violative of the equal protection strand of the fifth amendment's due process clause. The court found no legitimate governmental interest furthered in the exclusion of funding for certain medically necessary
abortions. Id. at 738. On the contrary, it found existing law to be supportive of effective
family planning to avoid unwanted pregnancies and births. Id.
The court also declared that the Hyde Amendment operates to the detriment of a "suspect class" consisting of indigent teenage women seeking medically necessary abortions.
Relying on the adverse effects teenage pregnancies impose on adolescent mothers, Judge
Dooling created a new classification of individuals entitled to heightened constitutional protection. Id.
68. Id. at 742.
69. Id.
70. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
71. For jurisprudential reasons, the Supreme Court addressed the statutory issue prior
to the constitutional questions because the Court "ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality. . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Id. at 4944, quoting Spector Motor
Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
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essary abortions. The Court examined the language, purpose, and
congressional intent underlying Title XIX. It concluded that
"[tjitle XIX does not require a participating State to pay for those
medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is
72
unavailable under the Hyde Amendment.
Unlike the district court,7 3 however, the Supreme Court did not
construe the Hyde Amendment to substantively amend Title
XIX. 74 It concentrated on the original congressional intent not to
impose a unilateral funding obligation on a state participating in
the Medicaid program. The Supreme Court ruled that the Hyde
Amendment did not substantively affect the Medicaid statute because Title XIX embodies sufficient flexibility to expand or contract with the availability of federal funds. 7' Consequently, with
the discontinuance of federal reimbursement for therapeutic abortions, a state is relieved from its parallel obligation
to fund such
7
abortions by the normal operation of Title XIX. 1
Redefining the Scope of Title XIX
The practical effect of the Supreme Court's construction of Title
XIX on the funding of medically necessary abortions is identical to
that of the district court. Both the lower court and the Supreme
Court held that Title XIX does not obligate a participating state
to fund medically necessary abortions. Instead of merely carving
out an exception to the general policy of providing medically necessary services to individuals eligible for Medicaid, however, the
Supreme Court redefined the scope of Title XIX. The preamble of
Title XIX articulates its objective of providing "necessary medical
services" to indigent persons.7 By definition, a therapeutic abortion is a medically necessary procedure.71 According to the comparability standard of Title XIX,7 9 individuals satisfying the two dis-

72. 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2685 (1980).
73. See note 65 supra.
74. 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2684-85 (1980).
75. Although the Court cites no specific authority for this contention, support may be
found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975) (illustrating the inherent
flexibility of federal reimbursement to states under Title XIX). See also Zbaraz v. Quern,
596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1979).
76. The Court noted, however, that a state remains free to continue funding those medically necessary abortions for which federal funding is unavailable if it elects to do so. 48
U.S.L.W. at 4945 n.16.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975).
78. See note 37 supra.
79. The Medicaid statute requires that a participating state provide certain basic medi-
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tinct, neutral criteria of financial need and medical need are
entitled to equal access to Medicaid resources.80 The Court's disposal of the statutory issue directly conflicts with this comparability
standard because the Hyde Amendment effectively denies medically needy individuals 1 access to Medicaid funds.
That the Hyde Amendment was, in fact, enacted, illustrates congressional intent82 to substantively amend Title XIX by removing
previously subsidized abortions from the scope of the Medicaid
program.' 3 By not adopting this view, however, the Court managed
to avoid the issue of the legitimacy of legislation by
appropriation."
The Due Process Challenge
The challengers of the Hyde Amendment raised a number of
constitutional issues. They first asserted that the funding limitations of the Hyde Amendment violated the due process clause of
the fifth amendment by impinging on the "fundamental" right of a
woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy." Relying substantially on its holding in Maher v. Roe, 6 the Court found no violation of the fundamental right to abortion recognized in Roe v.
Wade and its progeny. 8 7 The Court did not view the provisions of
the Hyde Amendment as an undue interference on a woman's freedom to undergo an abortion. Rather, it found that the Hyde
Amendment, by withholding federal funds for certain medically
necessary abortions, served to encourage the alternative activity of
normal childbirth." The Court concluded that the refusal to subsidize abortion places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy; it merely promotes a
cal services to the "categorically needy." See note 39 supra. The "comparability standard"
demands that once a state elects to extend a Medicaid service to the "medically needy," the
service provided to both the categorically and medically needy must be equal. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(B), (C) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V 1975).
80. See 100 S. Ct. at 2712 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See note 39 supra.
82. See note 58 supra.
83. See Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d
121 (1st Cir. 1979).
84. See notes 47 and 50 supra.
85. 100 S. Ct. at 2685.
86. See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
88. 100 S. Ct. at 2687. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (a state may
subsidize public education without incurring a corresponding obligation to fund private and
(1923).
parochial educational); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
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legitimate governmental interest.8 9
Recognizing the significant factual distinction between Maher
(elective abortions) and McRae (therapeutic abortions), the Court
in McRae briefly addressed the implications of a woman's interest
in protecting her health.90 The Court acknowledged that this interest was an important aspect of the Wade decision. The Court reasoned, however, that a woman's due process liberty to have an
abortion does not trigger a constitutional duty to publicly fund the
exercise of that liberty. Therefore, the Court concluded, whether a
woman's interest in protecting her health lies at the "core or periphery"9 1 of the abortion right is immaterial because there is no
corresponding constitutional entitlement to financial resources annexed to that right. The Court further explained that indigency,
and not govermental limitations on access to abortions, impedes a
woman from exercising her constitutionally protected right. The
Court declared that to hold otherwise would impose an affirmative
constitutional obligation on the federal government to fund all
medically necessary abortions for indigent women, regardless of
the existence of the Medicaid program. 2
In addition to the initial due process issue, the Court summarily
disposed of the contention that the Hyde Amendment penalized
the exercise of a woman's right to have an abortion.9 3 In footnote
discussion, the Court again applied the Maher rationale to hold
that a denial of public funding for constitutionally protected activity is not comparable to a "penalty" on that activity. Because the
Hyde Amendment did not provide for blanket disqualifications
from the receipt of Medicaid benefits, but only prohibited the subsidization of certain conduct, the Court found no penalization of
the fundamental right of abortion. 95
The Dissent's View
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2687-88.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2688.
92. Id. at 2689.
93. The penalty analysis was first applied in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(invalidated a state law conditioning the receipt of welfare benefits on a lengthy residency
requirement), and later extended in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974) (invalidated a coungty durational residency requirement as a precondition of medical
benefits for indigents).
94. 109 S. Ct. at 2688 n.19.
95. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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and Marshall, viewed the Hyde Amendment as a conscious attempt by Congress to circumvent the constitutionally protected
right of abortion. 96 The dissent further maintained that the Hyde
Amendment operates to deprive an indigent woman of her freedom
to secure an abortion by "injecting coercive financial incentives
favoring childbirth into a decision that is constitutionally guaranteed to be free from governmental intrusion."9' As a practical matter, for many women dependent upon Medicaid for all medical services, the funding of expenses associated with childbirth and
denial of funding for a medically necessary abortion forecloses the
exercise of a due process right. It is not only a pregnant woman's
poverty that prevents the assertion of her right to undergo an
abortion; it is her indigency coupled with the government's unequal funding of abortion and childbirth that obliterates her due
process liberty. 9
In a separate dissent, Justice Marshall noted that in choosing
the disfavored option of terminating her pregnancy, an indigent
woman is faced with two alternatives. She may either bear the
financial burden of a private abortion or resort to a non-medical
abortion." Thus, a woman must suffer either an economic or
health-related "penalty" in taking a constitutionally protected
course of action. 0 0 Conversely, an indigent woman who carries her
pregnancy to term is entitled to the full range of Medicaid benefits. According to the dissent, the majority, by upholding the Hyde
Amendment, has allowed Congress to condition the grant of Medicaid benefits on the relinquishment of a cherished constitutional
right.101
Disregard of the Maternal Health Interest
The Court's reliance on Maher in its treatment of the twopronged due process challenge reflects an unwillingness to recognize the tremendous influence the Hyde Amendment will have on

96. 100 S. Ct. at 2704 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2703-04.
98. Id.
99. 100 S. Ct. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See notes 93-95 supra and accompanying text.
101. 100 S. Ct. at 2705 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
271 U.S. 583 (1926).
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an indigent woman's choice to terminate a complicated pregnancy."0 2 Although the Court admitted that Maher and McRae
were factually distinguishable, it refused to recognize the significance of that distinction. A pregnant woman's health interest was
not at issue in Maher, and the inclusion of this interest in McRae
should have been a vital component of the constitutional analysis
of the abortion right. Wade and Bolton defined the fundamental
right of abortion in terms of medical necessity as a protected alternative to childbirth. Indeed, the Supreme Court had only a year
earlier recognized that it is a state's concern for maternal health,
not its interest in potential fetal life, that justifies regulation of the
abortion procedure during the second trimester.1 0 3 Thus, the McRae Court's disregard of the maternal health interest conflicts with
the Court's protectice recognition of this interest in Roe v. Wade
and its progeny.
A comparison of the Texas criminal statute struck down in
Wade and the Hyde Amendment reveals two striking similarities:
(1) the failure to distinguish between abortions performed early in
pregnancy and those performed later, and (2) the harsh restrictions limiting available abortions to those necessary for the preservation of the mother's life. Both of these elements of the Hyde
Amendment further illustrate its fatal inconsistency with the due
process liberty established in Wade.
In failing to recognize the substantial dilution of the abortion
right, the Court neglected to sufficiently analyze all ramifications
of the Hyde Amendment. Should an indigent woman have a nonpregnancy related physical problem that could not be treated because of her pregnancy, she would effectively be denied Medicaid
benefits for such treatment. An abortion would not be obtainable
because of her indigency and the effect of the Hyde Amendment.
Without the abortion, she could not receive proper medical care.
This point was graphically illustrated by medical testimony given
in the district coutrt. An indigent terminal cancer patient unable to

102. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigents cannot be denied a divorce by inability to pay filing fee). Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (states may not impose court and
transcript fees to effectively deny an indigent access to his/her fundamental right to a criminal appeal). But cf. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (indigents not entitled to a
waiver of bankruptcy fees); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (indigents not entitled
to waiver of court costs for civil appeals).
103. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
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use oral contraceptives sought an abortion when her alternative
means of contraception failed.'" Prior to the pregnancy, she had
been receiving radiation therapy which, if continued, would have
serious consequences for the fetus. Because the injunction of the
Hyde Amendment was still in effect, the woman was able to obtain
an abortion and continue her radiation treatment.108 After Harris
v. McRae, however, the only economically feasible course available
to a similarly situated woman would be to forego vital medical
treatment in addition to bearing an unwanted child. As a result,
some indigent women will effectively be victimized by the "broad
disqualifications" the majority failed to recognize.
The Establishment Clause Challenge
The next issue addressed by the Court concerned the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment with respect to the establishment clause of the first amendment. °6 In order to withstand this
constitutional attack, the Court noted that an enactment must
have a "secular legislative purpose, ' 1 0 7 and that it must neither advance nor inhibit religion,10 8 nor "foster an excessive governmental
entanglement with religion."" 9 The Court found that the Hyde
Amendment satisfied this criteria and, therefore, did not violate
the establishment clause.110
In contrast, the district court found that the Hyde Amendment
presented grave first amendment problems."' Following an extensive examination of the positions of various religious groups," 2 the
lower court determined that the decision to undergo an abortion is

104. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
105. Id.
106. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .. "
107. 100 S. Ct. at 2689, quoting Committee for Pub. Ed. & Rel. Lib. v. Levitt, 461 F.
Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The secular purpose in the abortion context has generally been
recognized as one of social policy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
108. 100 S. Ct. at 2689. See notes 115-16 infra and accompanying text.
109. Id. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
110. 100 S. Ct. at 2689. The Court noted that the mere fact that the Hyde Amendment
coincides with the official position of the Roman Catholic Church is not enough to establish
it as a legislative embodiment of those beliefs. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
111. See note 66 supra.
112. The district court examined the doctrines of the following religious organizations:
Roman Catholic, Orthodox Jewish, Lutheran-Missouri Synod, Conservative and Reform
Jewish, American Baptist, United Methodist Church, and American Protestant. McRae v.
Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 690-714 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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closely allied to a religiously formed conscience.'" Therefore, a woman's conscientious decision to terminate her pregnancy for health
reasons should be doubly protected when exercised in conformity
with those religious beliefs and teachings protected by the first
114
amendment.
Abortion and Religious Beliefs: Avoiding the Issue
The Supreme Court's laconic treatment of the establishment
clause argument reflects a purposeful avoidance of the single most
sensitive and important legal question in the abortion area: "the
moment at which the civil right to life vests and becomes a legally
protectable interest. 11 5 Alluding to this issue, the Court categorized the belief that a fetus is a human being from the moment of
conception as a "reflection of 'traditionalist' values." 1 6 In this regard, the Court recognized that this particular belief transcends
religious boundaries. A general consensus on the point at which life
begins may never be possible. If life at conception could be determined as a biological fact, the controversy would be scientifically
resolved, and would cease to pose establishment clause
1 17
problems.
The Equal Protection Challenge
The Court faced the final constitutional argument that the Hyde
Amendment violated the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment's due process clause.11 8 The Court characterized the
equal protection guarantee as one requiring only a rational relationship between a legislative enactment and a legitimate governmental interest.1 19 Emphasizing that a statutory scheme is presumptively valid unless it impinges upon a "fundamental" right"
113. Id. at 742.
114. Id. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
115. Jonas and Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade with Commentaries, 9 J. MAnSHALL J. 551, 583 (1976).
116. 100 S. Ct. at 2689.
117. See generally Note, Zbaraz v. Quern - Abortion and Medicaid: The Public Funding Dilemma, 12 J. MARsHALL J. 609 (1979).
118. The Hyde Amendment was also attacked on the ground that it is void for vagueness. The Court found the provisions of the Hyde Amendment to be set out in terms readily
comprehensible to an "ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense." 100 S. Ct. at
2685 n.17, quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
119. 100 S. Ct. at 2692.
120. Fundamental rights include the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
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or creates a "suspect" classification,12 1 the Court employed the
two-tiered constitutional analysis.122 Under this analysis, legislative
classifications impinging upon a "fundamental" right or based on
suspect criteria not only lose their presumptive validity, but are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny which can only be satisfied by the
showing of a "compelling governmental interest.' 23 All other legislative classifications are valid, however, if they demonstrate a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.' 2 '
Because the Court had already determined that no fundamental
rights had been violated, 25 it focused on whether or not the Hyde
Amendment created a "suspect" classification. Employing the
Maher rationale,'2 6 the Court ultimately uncovered no suspect criteria or impact which would render the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional. 2 7 Although the majority recognized that the impact of

(1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to avoid involuntary sterilization, Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the right of parents to raise and educate their children,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
121. Suspect classifications include those based on race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
122. For a thorough discussion of the equal protection analysis see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). See generally Barrett,
JudicialSupervision of Legislative Classifications - A More Modest Role for Equal Protection, B.Y.U.L. REV. 89 (1976); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARv.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 117 (1978); Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CALiF. L. REV. 341 (1949). See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 312-14 (1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1973).
123. See authorities cited in notes 117-18 supra.
124. Classifications in the area of economics or social welfare generally fall under this
test. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (financing of public
schools); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamp act
exclusion); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (filing fee to appeal from decision to
terminate welfare benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy fees and
access to courts); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (welfare benefits); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (provisions of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program).
125. 100 S. Ct. at 2689. See text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
126. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Maher utilized the rational basis test in the context of nontherapeutic abortions. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
127. The Supreme Court refuted the district court's finding of a "suspect" class composed of teenage women desiring medically necessary abortions. Because the Hyde Amendment is facially neutral as to age, a showing of purposeful discrimination and not a mere
disproportionate impact is required. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Absent such a showing of
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the Hyde Amendment falls almost entirely on the indigent, the
Court held that in the absence of proof of purposeful discrimination, poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.12
Having determined that the Hyde Amendment was not predicated on suspect criteria and that no fundamental right was im1 29
pinged, the Court applied the lower level "rational basis" test.
The Court accepted the government's position that the Hyde
Amendment serves the legitimate interest of protecting the potential life of the fetus by encouraging normal childbirth. In addition,
the Court found the Hyde Amendment to be rationally related to
the government's stated objective. Thus, the Hyde Amendment
withstood the equal protection challenge and was found to be constitutionally sound.180
In his dissent, Justice Marshall strongly criticized the rigidity in
application of the majority's two-tier, strict scrutiny/rational basis
approach to equal protection.'' He failed to see how any legitimate governmental interest is furthered by the Hyde Amendment
when balanced against the impact of the amendment on indigent
women.' 8 2 Finally, Justice Marshall found it untenable that indigent women should be "treated with the same deference given to
legislation distinguishing among business interests" by employing
the rational relation standard. 32
Failure to Apply Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Justice Marshall was justified in criticizing the majority's adherence to the traditional equal protection analysis. The Court, in recent years, has not always followed the "two-tier" approach, but
has demanded more than a mere rationality standard in upholding
governmental classifications.'3 Unfortunately, the majority did not
intent, the Hyde Amendment does not violate the equal protection clause with respect to
teenage women. 100 S. Ct. at 2691-92 n.26.
128. Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671 (1980); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471. (1970).
129. 100 S. Ct. at 2693.
130. Id.
131. 100 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
113-15 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
132. 100 S. Ct. at 2710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2708. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
134. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1979) (alienage); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex discrimination).
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deem it advisable to require a more substantial justification from
the government in upholding the Hyde Amendment. The Court
stated that it is not its mission "to decide whether the balance of
competing interests reflected in the Hyde Amendment is wise social policy.

' 13 5

It is, however, the function of the Court to deter-

mine if social policy, wise or unwise, contravenes any constitutionally protected rights. The implications of the Hyde Amendment on
indigent women, in addition to its serious health ramifications,
suggest that justice would be better served by a greater showing of
rationality.
Had the Court elected to apply a strict scrutiny analysis requiring the government to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest, the Hyde Amendment could not have been upheld without
expressly overruling Roe v. Wade. This result necessarily follows
because the Court in Wade did not recognize the compelling interest in potential fetal life until the third trimester. Because it fails
to distinguish the various stages of pregnancy, the Hyde Amendment should not survive a constitutional attack, even if the federal
government succeeded in establishing its compelling interest in the
potential life. It follows, then, that the lack of standards in the
Hyde Amendment would render it unconstitutional under strict judicial scrutiny.
IMPACT OF THE HYDE AMENDMENT

Harris v. McRae represents a further contraction of the right of
abortion originally pronounced in Roe v. Wade. By first allowing
elective abortions to be weeded from the scope of Medicaid coverage in Beal, Maher and Poelker,'86 the Court ostensibly pruned
away a significant segment of the abortion right. In further assenting to the termination of Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions, the Court has dealt a near fatal blow to the right of
abortion as it exists for indigent women. The constitutional liberty
to secure an abortion free from undue governmental interference
now carries a price tag for poverty-stricken women and will be obtainable only by those who can afford to assert that right. As a
consequence of the validation of the Hyde Amendment, there will
undoubtedly be an upsurge of "back-alley" abortions and un13
wanted childbirths.

135.
136.
137.

7

100 S. Ct. at 2693.
See notes 30-36 and 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
100 S. Ct. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Prior to the imposition of the funding
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The Hyde Amendment cannot be viewed as a means of reducing
welfare costs. In Illinois, the average cost of an abortion is approximately $150, whereas the cost of a childbirth exceeds $1350.111 The
total increase in Medicaid and related costs -associated with childbirth is estimated to be about $20,000,000 per fiscal year in Illinois
alone. 5 9 Consequently, it is apparent that not only indigent pregnant women but the taxpayer as well will feel the impact of the
Hyde Amendment.
It is ironic that the Supreme Court can rationalize the denial of
public funds for therapeutic abortions in a program designed to
finance medically necessary health services. In so doing, the Court
not only exhibits a disregard for the plight of indigent women, but
sets dangerous precedent as well. By conditioning the receipt of
Medicaid benefits on the surrender of the constitutional right to
obtain an abortion, the Supreme Court effectively obliterates that
right. Harris v. McRae could very well be the harbinger of the
eventual defeat of any fundamental, personal right enjoyed by the
indigent; the exercise of which now appears dependent upon congressional discretion in the field of public funding.
CONCLUSION

The dangers inherent in upholding the Hyde Amendment are of
immense proportion. If an appropriations bill can effectively curtail the assertion of a constitutional right, then the very foundation
of that right is endangered. The appropriate vehicle for altering
fundamental rights is the Constitution itself, and nothing short of
a constitutional amendment should be allowed to single out and
crush a constitutionally protected freedom. By continuing its policy of deferring to the legislature the resolution of sensitive and
controversial socio-economic issues, the Supreme Court is gradually abandoning its post as guardian of constitutional rights.
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With the dissolution of the injunction forbidding the enforcement of the Hyde Amendment in 1977, the number of federally funded abortions fell to 2,000 and the unment need
for Medicaid-funded abortions rose to about 234,000 for fiscal year 1978. Id.
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